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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. 78-2-2 (3) (a) (1996). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. The Stipulation was signed under significant Duress and the order thereon 
should be set aside by the court. 
Utah law is clear that a party may invalidate a contract where there is a 
showing that a party committed a harmful act which put another party in fear such as to 
compel him to act against his will. Heglar Ranch, Inc, vs. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390 
(Utah 1980). That ruling is derived from an earlier Utah case that offers the rule that 
"any wrongful act or threat which actually puts the victim in such fear as to compel him 
to act against his will constitutes duress" which will invalidate a contract. Fox vs. 
Piercev. 227 P.2d 763 (Utah 1951V 
The Fox case, supra, designates three parameters for the consideration of 
the invalidation of a contract which include: 
(1) that the other contracting party committed a wrongful act; 
(2) which put the initial party in fear; 
(3) such as to compel him to act against his will. 
(4) such as to compel him to act against his will. 
Other Pacific Coast jurisdictions help to embellish upon the application 
of the former stated common law rule accepted and applied in Utah. 
Regarding the state of mind of the victim of duress it is stated in Wiesen 
vs. Short, 604 P.2d 1191 (Colo 1979), "to establish duress as a ground for avoidance 
of a contract.. .it must clearly appear that force or threats employed actually subjugated 
the mind and will of the person against whom they were directed, and were thus the sole 
and efficient cause of action which he took". It could not be any more clear than 
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plaintiff gave completely beyond what may have reasonably been expected because she 
was totally subjected to the will of the defendant which was the sole cause of her action. 
The threat of duress against plaintiff herein was that she had to give up 
everything, her judgment, her claim for return of a vehicle, her payment for a debt of 
defendant, her personal property, nearly everything she had to obtain the agreement to 
dismiss the Protective Order. Further, it was the only reasonable alternative. 
The party being compelled to assent against his will must be faced with it 
as the only reasonable alternative for the doctrine of duress to remedy. Frank Culver 
Elec, Inc. vs. Jorgenson, 664 P.2d 226, (Ariz. 1983). 
Courts will not enforce a bargain where one party has unconscionably 
taken advantage of the distress of the other. Inman vs. Clyde Hall Drilling Co., 369 P 2d 
498, (Alaska 1962), 4 A.L.R. 3d 430. It is reasonable to assume a person in jail is in 
distress. Plaintiff also faced the necessity of obtaining freedom to care for her daughter 
who was seriously ill. 
With regard to the wrongful act requirement of the remedy of the doctrine 
of duress offers, an act or threat constitutes duress of it is wrongful and places party 
entering into transaction in such fear as to preclude the exercise by him of free will and 
Judgment. Dunbar vs. Dunbar, 429 P.2d 949, (Ariz. 1967). The requirement of a 
wrongful act may be met if it is wrongful in the moral sense. Totem Marine Tug 
& Barge, Inc. vs. Alyseka Pipeline Service Co., 584 P.2d 15, (Alaska 1978) 9 A.L.R. 
4th 928. 
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For Plaintiff to be required to give all that she was required to give to 
obtain her freedom was a moral wrong by the defendant. He knew her plight and 
obtained extreme advantage over her for it. The consideration he paid by dismissing the 
Protective Order was minute and totally inadequate in comparison to what he required 
of plaintiff for his act requiring no cost whatsoever. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations, whose 
Interpretation is determinative in the instant appeal, are set out verbatim, with the 
Appropriate citation in the body and arguments of the instant brief. 
5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Plaintiff filed this matter for the pursuit of return of vehicle owned by 
plaintiff, namely a 1992 Lexus SC400 vehicle. 
2. Subsequent to the filing of complaint and answer in the above matter 
circumstances completely changed causing that this plaintiff gave over title and interest 
in and to the subject vehicle pursuant to Stipulation on file herein. Said Stipulation also 
designated the transfer of other personal property and rights to be given to the defendant 
as set forth hereafter. 
3. The Stipulation agreed that plaintiff s judgment against defendant in small 
claims court, Civil No., 994004279SC, allowing recovery of rents and other damages to 
plaintiff in the amount of $5,071.00 with interest be completely dismissed with prejudice 
in favor of defendant. (See plaintiffs exhibit "A" attached hereto Plaintiffs Affidavit). 
4. A previously disputed matter of debts between the parties, potentially a 
litigation matter for small claims regarding the amount of $1,400.00 was Stipulated in 
favor of defendant and plaintiff agreed to pay the amount to defendant by March 31, 
2000. 
5. The Stipulation allows that the plaintiff without further consideration shall 
turn over the defendant personal property owned and in the possession of plaintiff, 
much of the personal property enumerated was owned or received by plaintiff as a 
gift and was the personal property of defendant. 
6. The circumstances that caused plaintiff no alternative to commit to such 
a Stipulation was that plaintiff was sentenced to a short jail term of a few months for 
involvment in a criminal matter pending before the above entitled court. Defendant was 
allowed to be free from imposition of the subject criminal sentence of the court except 
there existed a Protective Order obtained by defendant that required dismissal before 
plaintiff could be freed from the jail sentence. 
7. At the same time the jail sentence was imposed plaintiffs daughter was 
seriously ill and with no one to care for her except the plaintiff herein. 
8. Therefore two compelling reasons existed for plaintiff to secure the 
dismissal of defendant's Protective Order against plaintiff at any cost. There was no 
alternative. 
9. After the Stipulation and Order of this Court was entered defendant 
dismissed the Protective Order pursuant to the agreement. (See plaintiffs Exhibit B 
attached hereto to Plaintiffs Affidavit). 
10. Release of the plaintiff from jail was effective thereafter, (see Exhibit 
"C" attached hereto to Plaintiffs Affidavit). 
11. The plaintiff first approached defendant about a dismissal of his 
Protective Order after she had been incarcerated. Plaintiff explained to defendant that 
she could obtain release if his Protective Order was dismissed. Plaintiff also explained 
the reasons why she needed release. Plaintiff was desperate to provide help to her 
daughter besides the fact that she could be freed from incarceration if the Protective 
Order was dismissed. 
12. The defendant found this as his opportunity to resolve all pending matters 
of personal property disputes that had arisen between the parties while they were 
co-habitating. The defendant had lost the small claims matter and was bound to lose 
the matter filed herein after the ownership of the subject vehicle. 
13. The plaintiff had supported defendant for a lengthy period of time and did 
not owe the $1,400.00 debt plaintiff agreed to pay for the defendant. 
14. The defendant further demanded nearly all of the personal property owned 
by plaintiff which defendant had absolutely no right or title to whatsoever to finally agree 
to dismiss his Protective Order. 
15. The plaintiff had no choice but to agree even though the bargain the 
defendant struck was morally wrong. 
16. The above-entitled matter came before the court on June 20,2000, the 
Plaintiff was represented by her counsel Rex B. Bushman and Defendant Mariusz 
Bienkowski was represented by, his counsel J. Kent Holland. After hearing and good 
Cause showing regard the matter it is hereby ordered that the Motion was Denied on 
June 29, 2000. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff filed this matter for the pursuit of return of vehicle owned by 
plaintiff, namely, a 1992 Lexus SC400 vehicle. 
2. Subsequent to the filing of the complaint and answer in the above matter 
circumstances completely changed causing that this plaintiff gave over title and interest 
in and to the subject vehicle pursuant to Stipulation on file herein. Said Stipulation also 
designated the transfer of other personal property and rights to be given to the defendant 
has set forth hereafter. 
3. The Stipulation agreed that plaintiff s judgment against defendant in small 
claims court, Civil No. 994004279SC, allowing recovery of rents and other damages to 
plaintiff in the amount of $5071.00 with interest be completely dismissed with prejudice 
in favor of defendant. (See plaintiffs exhibit "A" attached hereto to Plaintiffs Affidavit). 
4. A previously disputed matter of debts between the parties, potentially a 
litigation matter for small claims regarding the amount of $1,400.00, was Stipulated in 
favor of defendant and plaintiff agreed to pay the amount to defendant by March 31, 
2000. If payment is not made the Stipulation allows for judgment in that amount to be 
entered against plaintiff.(See Stipulation on file herein). 
5. The Stipulation allows that plaintiff without further consideration shall 
turn over to the defendant personal property owned or in possession of plaintiff. 
Much of the personal property enumerated was owned or received by plaintiff as a 
Gift, or payment on funds owned and was never the personal property of defendant. 
(See Stipulation on file herein). 
6. Attorney fees to enforce the Stipulation were allowed to defendant. 
7. The circumstances that caused plaintiff no alternative to commit such a 
Stipulation were that plaintiff was sentenced to a short jail term of three months for 
involvement in a criminal matter pending before the above entitled Court. Defendant 
was allowed to be free from imposition of the subject criminal sentence of the court 
except that there existed a Protective Order obtained by defendant that required dismissal 
before plaintiff could be freed from the jail sentence. 
8. At the same time the jail sentence was imposed plaintiffs daughter was 
seriously ill and with no one to care for except the plaintiff herein. 
9. Therefore two compelling reasons existed for plaintiff to secure the 
Dismissal of defendant's Protective Order against plaintiff at any cost. There was no 
Alternative. 
10. After the Stipulation and Order of this Court was entered defendant 
dismissed the Protective Order pursuant to the agreement. (See plaintiffs Exhibit "B" 
attached hereto to Plaintiffs Affidavit). 
11. Release of the plaintiff from jail was effective thereafter. (See Exhibit 
"C" attached hereto to Plaintiffs Affidavit). 
12. The plaintiff first approached defendant about a dismissal of his Protective 
Order after she had been incarcerated. Plaintiff explained to the defendant that she could 
obtain release if both Protective Orders were dismissed, (his and hers) Plaintiff also 
explained the reasons why she needed released aside from the fact that she did not enjoy 
being incarcerated. Plaintiff was desperate to provide help to her daughter besides the 
fact that she could be freed from incarceration if the Protective Order was dismissed. 
13. The defendant found this as his opportunity to resolve all pending matters 
of personal property disputes that had arisen between the parties while they were co-
habitating. The defendant had lost the small claims matter and was bound to lose the 
matter filed herein over the ownership of the subject vehicle. 
14. The plaintiff had supported defendant for a lengthy period of time and did 
not owe the $1,400.00 debt plaintiff agreed to pay for defendant. 
15. The defendant further demanded nearly all of the personal property owned 
by plaintiff which defendant had absolutely no right or title to whasoever to finally agree 
to dismiss his Protective Order. 
16. The plaintiff had no choice but to agree even though the bargain the 
Defendant struck was morally wrong. 
17. Given that plaintiff has no further desire to communicate in any way with 
Defendant there is no possibility of a further Protective Order against her and the jail 
Term is now over with no further threat of plaintiff s incarceration. (See Plaintiffs 
Affidavit attached hereto for all facts stated herebefore). 
ARGUMENT 
L THE STIPULATION WAS SIGNED UNDER SIGNIFICANT DURESS 
AND THE ORDER THEREON SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BY THE COURT. 
Utah law is clear that a party may invalidate a contract where there 
is a showing tl lat a party committed a harmful i- ' : ; . • ! . . ^arty in fear such 
as to compel him to act against his will. Heglar Ranch, Inc. vs. Stillman, 619 P .2d 
1390 (Utah 1980). That ruling is derived from an earlier Utah case that offers the 
rule that "any wrongful act or threat which actually puts the victim ii I si ich feai as to 
compel him to act against his will constitutes duress" which will invalidate a contract. 
Fox vs. Pericey, 227 P 2d 763 (Utah 1951). 
The Fox case, supra, designates three parameters for the consideration of the 
invalidation of a contract which include: 
(1) That the other contracting party committed a wrongful act: 
(2) which put the initial party in fear; 
(3) such as to compel him to act against his will. 
other Pacific Coast jurisdictions help to embellish upon the application of the 
former stated common law rule accepted and applied in Utah. Regarding the state of 
mind of the victim of duress it is stated in Wiesen vs. Short, 604 P. 2d 1191 (Colo 
1979), "to establish duress as a ground for avoidance of a contract.... It must clearly 
appear that force or threats employed actually subjugated the mind and will of the 
person against whom they directed, and were thus the sole and efficient cause of 
action which he took". It could not be any more clear than plaintiff gave completely 
beyond what may have reasonably been expected because she was totally subjected 
to the will of the defendant which was the sole cause of her action. 
The threat of duress against plaintiff herein was that she had to give up 
everything, Iini lud^nu'iil, ha n'l.iiiii lor icliiii'ii of a vdiiH Ilk", liei payment tl a 
debt of defendant, her personal property, nearly everything she had to obtain the 
agreement to dismiss the Protective Order. Further, it was the only reasonable 
alternative. 
The party being compelled to assent against his will must be faced with it 
as the only reasonable alternative for the doctrine of di iress to remedy I'rank 
Culver Elec, Inc. vs. Jorgenson, 664 P2d 226, (Ariz. 1983) 
courts will not enforce a bargain where one party was unconscionably taken advantage 
of the distress of the other. Inman vs. Clyde Hall Drilling Co., 369 P.2d 498, 
(Alaska 1962), 4 A.L.R. 3d 430. It is reasonable to assume a person in jail is in 
distress. Plaintff also faced the necessity of obtaining freedom to care for her daughter 
who was seriously ill. 
With regard to the wrongful act requirement of the remedy the doctrine of duress 
offers, an act or threat constitutes duress of it is wrongful and places party entering into 
transactions in such fear as to preclude the exercise by him of free will and judgment. 
Dunbar vs. Dunbar, 429 P.2d 949, (Ariz. 1967) The requirement of a wrongful act 
may be met if it is wrongful in the moral sense. Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. 
Vs. Alyseka Pipeline Service Co., 584 P.2d 15, (Alaska 1978) 9 A.L.R. 4th 928. 
For plaintiff to be required to give all that she required to give to obtain her 
freedom was a moral wrong by the defendant. He knew her plight and obtained extreme 
advantage over her for it. The consideration he paid by dismissing the Protective Order 
was minute and totally inadequate in comparison to what he required of plaintiff for his 
act requiring no cost whatsoever. 
CONCLUSION 
of Appeals Decision, and remand the case for the entry of orders or proceedings 
consistent with this Court's instructions set forth in it's Opinion. 
Plaintiff has met all conditions under Utah law of Fox vs. Piercey, 227 P 2d 763 
(Utah 1951) to be relieved of the subject stipulation and order herein by way the 
the doctrine of duress. The doctrine of duress allows avoidance of the stipulation entered 
into between the parties and the setting aside of the court order entered thereon. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of Decembei , 2000. 
OCL /OHf^i^fA. 44Q/TU 
Linda Munford, Pro Se 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief 
To the following counsel, postage prepaid and by U.S. Mail, this / 0 
Of December, 2000: 
Bradley J. Schofield 
Anderson & Holland 
623 East First South 
P.O.Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643 
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Rex B. Bushman, Esq. #0521 
REX B. BUSHMAN, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
115 E. Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-8020 
Facsimile: (801) 533-8877 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA MUNFORD, : 
Plaintiff, : PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT 
vs . 
MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI, : Civil No. 990906380 
Defendant. : Judge GJjenn K. Twasaki 
STATE OF~TJTAH ) 
: S S . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
T, Linda Munford, hereby depose and state under oath as 
follows: 
1. I am plaintiff in the above entitled litigation 
matter for the pursuit of return of vehicle owned by plaintiff, 
namely, a 1992 Lexus SC400 vehicle. 
2. Subsequent to the filing of complaint and answer in 
the above matter circumstances completely changed causing that 
this plaintiff gave ovei title and interest in and to the 
subject vehicle pursuant to Stipulation on file herein. Said 
Stipulation also designated the transfer of other personal 
property and rights to be given to the defendant as set forth 
hereafter. 
3. The Stipulation agreed that plaintiff's judgment 
against defendant in small claims court, Civil No. 994004279SC, 
allowing recovery of rents and other damages to plaintiff in 
the amount of $5,071.00 with interest be completely dismissed 
with prejudice in favor of defendant. (See plaintiff's Exhibit 
UA!I attached hereto). 
4. A previously disputed matter of debts betweem the 
parties, potentially a litigation matter for small claims 
regarding the amount of $1,400.00, was stipulated in favor of 
defendant and plaintiff agreed to pay the amount to defendant 
by March 31, 2000. If payment is not made the Stipulation 
allows for judgment in that amount to be entered against 
plaintiff. (See Stipulation on file herein). 
5. The Stipulation allows that plaintiff without 
further consideration shall turn over the defendant the 
following personal property owned or in possession of 
plainti ff: 
Sanyo 25" TV; Sanyo stereo; Emerson boom box; mattress 
and bed frame; Pantex camera; thirty CD's; fifty music tapes; 
microphone; white night stand and lamp; iron; microwave; alarm 
clock; brown plates, dishes and cups; Polish passport; tire" 
rims for Lexus; headlights for Lexus; two pillows; white 
blanket; pictures of defendant's mother; father and other 
relatives; day planner; bowling ball with shoes and carrier; 
Masters Degree Certificate for Zdzistaw Bienkowski; brown 
shoes; black shoes; sandals; snow shoes; cowboy boots; light 
green suit; two pair of pants with jacket; black pants; green 
jeans; light brown jeans; blue jeans; three ties; dark green 
coat; two red and blue jackets; leather jacket with hat; belts; 
black shirt; three white shirts; polish t-shirl with eagle; 
four Adidas t-shirts; two Nike t-shirts; Chaps t-shirt; Olympic 
t-shirt ; four three button t-shirts; and Awa stereo. 
Much of the personal property enumerated was owned or 
receivcMl by plaintiff as a gift and was never the personal 
property of defendant. (See Stipulation on file herein). 
6. Attorney fees to enforce the Stipulation were 
allowd I defendant. 
7. The circumstances that caused plaintiff no 
alternative to commit to such a Stipulation were that plaintiff 
was sentenced to a short jail term of several months for 
involvement in a criminal matter pending before the above 
entitled Court. Plaintiff was allowed to be Ifee from 
imposition of the subject criminal sentence of the court except 
that there existed a Protective Order obtained by defendant 
that required dismissal before plaintiff could be freed from 
the jail sentence and on probation only. 
8. At the same time the jail sentence was imposed 
plaintiff's daughter was seriously ill and with no one to care 
for her except the plaintiff herein. 
9. Therefore two significant reasons existed for 
plaintiff to secure the dismissal of defendant's Protective 
Order against plaintiff. 
10. After the Stipulation and Order of this"Court was 
entered defendant dismissed the Protective Order pursuant to 
the agreement. (See plaintiff's Exhibit f!Bu attached hereto). 
11. Release of the plaintiff from jail was effective 
thereafter. (See Exhibit "CM attached hereto) 
12. The plaintiff first approached defendant about a 
dismissal of his Protective Older after she had been 
incarcerated. Plaintiff explained to defendant that she could 
Stipulation and 'Order herein may be set aside and plaintiff be 
restored to her rights. 
DATED this day of April, 2000. 
Linda Munford 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of 
April, 2000. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Linda Munford, Pro So 
5242 Cobblccreek Road, #13- il 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Phone: 42 4-3 5 26/560-65 00 
*r\ 
FIIID oisTnicreinuaT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 0 7 2000 
IN THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY JUSTICE COURT 
COUNTY OF S'Al,r LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA MUNFOUD, 
Pla.inti.tf , 
v, 
M/WUUSZ RTENKOWSKI, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
MOTION AND ORDER-TO 
DISMISS SMALL CLAIMS 
C a s o No. 9 ^ 4 0 i H ? 7 9 S C 
J uiTq e i Pe?ggy-ATTOTnb-
^C^/2^7S -i*HRMS 
COMES NOV;, plaint iff and rcoves the above-entitled court 
to dismiss this action and the motion for supplement proceed!nys 
with prejudice, 
DATED thjsu^ day of January, 2000. 
,^i vANVOom^ m 
•A v \<li H Union P»<1< to*. 
,
;
 U) M«»vaie UT8404* 
' 1*1 My r.o'.r»misr^on Cxpim* 
STATE Of: UTAH 
Q £ : J.I ^  .Z2]< ± >ULL ?C21 
r t *i T\ i\ M ! i M ir/^ t:» n / / LI ft DA Mil N FORD 
Pi a i n t i f 1 
'V ' / / / -; 
SUBSCHLBED AND SWORN to before me th.ii*** _ day of -JarmafV-', 7000. 
/ 
NOTWY r u r u c 
R<?sj/dimj / i 'n : 
My Commissi.on Expire' 
Exhibit "A" 
Thira Ju<!i::,hi district »* 
JAN 
F 
).f 
Mariusz Bienkowski, Pro Se 
P.O. Box 712425 »y 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84171-2425 
SAlf L/KE CftLWY 
uly Ctorfc 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF S A L r F x A K E J C O U N T Y ^ / 
STATE OF UTAH JAM J [ _./]
 f ^ 
MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI, By 
Plaintiff, 
LINDA MUNFORD, 
Defendant, 
MOTIOW AND ORDER TO 
DISMISS PROTECTIVE ORDER \ ) 
Case No. 994905991CA 
Judge: Homer F. Wilkinson 
COMES NOW, plaintiff and moves the above-entitled court 
to dismiss the protective order that has been entered in this 
matter. 
DATED this ^£_ day of January, 2000, 
'OTA&Y PUBUC 
v::r,;»A IP M4157 
>*rn'>s.S'Cn Expire* 
3TATE OF UTAH 
MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKX 
Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this -d«iy_.of January/ 2000, 
V 
/ ^ 
^ 
My Commission Expires: 08/23/2001 
E x h i b i t " B " 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
R e s i d i n g i n : M j ^ r a y , . U tah 
O R D E R 
BASED upon the motion filed by plaintiff, a copy of 
which is on file herein, and other good and sufficient cause 
having been shown, it is hereby ordered and decreed *~hat this 
action be dismissed. 
DATED thi<* 21 day of , ^ ^ ^ , 2000. 
BY THE COURT:X 
?VI^ V. \ ut LiNUA MCKEAN 
f^Y^rrw DOCUMENT SO 9 ^ - 1 I 0 2 2 U I BAILORSENTFNOE I 7 0 HAYS JUDGE FNDRERG 
OCCUPATION 
SECRETARY mm^^^^m—* *-^r-dTA,e 
EMERGENCY N O T r C (NAMF A C C E S S ) 
RACHEL MUNfORD 1688 E WINWARD OR 
EMPLOYED B^ (NAME ADDRESS) 
iREENSIREEl 
— f,HATio7^^MH1f-R — 
SLC, UT 
r, l 0 TROLLY SQUARE 
GOV! TMI 
SI ( . UI 
AfcHESTEtrS 
CONDITION 
I INT OX 
iNO 
SKK 
NO 
WHO 
NO 
JgF^pfl 
EMFfi( ^HNFNO 
r 7 8 - 4 4 I S 
\ \OP l PHONC NO 
5 ^ 2 - 4 i 0 0 
CXPLAIN 
NO $EE MEDICAL SCREENING RFTORT 
I REMARKS 
02 /02 /00 
1700 
MASON, RONALfl 
HELFASFD BY 
Officer Hat t i n s 
IncAsnMronnEiFv**-
I Ankle Mon i to r P roe iam 
Arr FIOVFO R^  
I n h i b i t . " C 
MARTIN J. PEZELY, #2598 
Attorney for Defendant 
7 700 South Maple Street 
Midvale, Utah 8404? 
Phone: 255-1261 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA MUNFORD, 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Plaintiff, : 
v, ; 
Civil No. 990906380 
MARIUSZ BIENKOWSK1, : Judge: Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW, the plaintiff and defendant and enters into 
the following settlement aqreempnt with the intent of resolving 
all the issues contained in the abovp-enti>led matter 
The parties acknowledqe that they are entering into this 
agreement voluntarily and that they intend to be bound by the 
terms and conditions of this settlement agreement. 
WHEREAS, plaintiff has filed an action against defendant 
in the above-entitled court involving a 1992 Lexus SC400 vehicle, 
\ 
vehicle identxficatibn number/serial number JT8UZ30C4N0009924; and 
WHERFAS, plaintiff has filed another action in small 
claims couit in Salt Lake County, State of Utah under civil no. 
994004279SC; &nd 
WHFREAS, the parties have mcuned certain credit c&td 
obligations; and 
WHEREAS, plaintiff has in her possession or in her 
control miscellaneous pergonal items that belong to the defendant; 
and 
WHEREAS, each party has issued a protective order 
against the other party; and 
WHEREAS, the parties wish to resolve all the above 
issues and have agreed to a settlement that each is willing to 
enter into with the intent of settling said issues. 
WHEREAS/ the parties hereto each warrant and represent 
to the other that they fully understand all of the terms, 
covenants, conditions and obligations incumbent upon each of them 
by virtue of this agreement to be performed or contemplated by 
each of them hereunder, and each believes the same to be fair, 
just and reasonable, 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of 
the covenants contained herein, the parties hereto mutually agree 
as follows: 
1. That both parties hav^ received a copy of the 
settlement agreement, have reviewed the contents and understand 
said contents. 
2, That plaintiif shall dismiss with prejudice the 
above-entitled action and by said dismissal agreeo that defendant 
2 
shall have all the right, title and interest involving a 1992 
Lexus SC400 vehicle, vehicle identification number/serial number 
JT8U2 4N0009924, without any claim by plaintiff. 
3, That plaintiff shall immediately dismiss with 
prejudice the small claims court action she has filed under civil 
no. 994004279SC. 
4, That plaintiff shall pay defendant the sum of 
$1,400.00 to be used by defendant towards payment of the credit 
card obligations incurred by the parties. Said sum shall be paid 
not later than March 31, 2000. If plaintiff shall fail to pay 
said sum by March 31, 2000 then a judgement shall enter against 
plaintiff for $1,400.00 in favor of the defendant. 
5, That plaintiff shall return to defendant not later 
than February 15, 2000 the following peisonal items: 
Sanyo 25" tv; Sanyo stereo; Emerson boom box; mattress 
and bed frame; Pantex camera; thirty CD's; fifty music 
tapes; microphone; white niqht stand and lamp; iron; 
microwave; alarm clock; brown plates, dishes and cups; 
Polish passport; tire rims for Lexus; headlights for 
Lexus; two pillows; white blanket; pictures of my 
client's mother, father and other relatives; day 
planner; bawling ball with shoes and carrier; Masters 
Degree Certificate for Zdzistaw Bienkowski; brown shoes; 
black shoes; sandals; snow shoes; cowboy boots; light 
green suit; two pair of pants with jacket; black pants; 
green jeans; light brown jeans; blue jeans; three ties; 
dark green coat; two red and blue jackets; leather 
jacket with hat; belts; black shirt; three white shirts; 
polish t-shirt with eagle; four Adidas t-shirts; two 
Nike t-shirts; Chaps t-shirt; Olympic t-shirt; four 
three button t-shirts; and Awa stereo. 
6. That each party shall take the necessary steps to 
try to diamies the protective order each has against the other. 
7* That plaintiff shall not have any contact whether 
personal via telephone or any other means with defendant, his 
family located here in the United States or any member of his 
family in Poland. 
8. That defendant shall not have any contact whether 
personal via telephone or any other means with plaintiff or her 
family. 
9. That each party shall assume and pay their own 
attorney fees and court costs incurred in this action. 
10. That if any party to this agreement shall incur any 
costs resulting from enforcement of this agreement or any of the 
provisions of this agreement, the defaulting party shall be liable 
to the prevailing party for such costs. Costs, as used, herein, 
shall include costs of enforcement, interpretation, or collection, 
including, without limitation, reasonable attorney's fees, court 
costs, collection charges, travel and other related or similar 
expenses. 
11. This\ agreement shall be binding upon and shall 
mure to the benefit of the parties hereto, and their respective 
legal representatives, successors and assigns, 
12. That the foregoing constitutes the entire agreement 
4 
of the parties. 
DATED this day of January, 2000-
L # D A HUNFORD V ~~ 
oi 
Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this $ g day of^  January, 2000, 
ft-4 smjs«^ 
HOTtmrwuc _ 
NANCY t-VAN VOOflHW 
?\tik S. Unic* p** A*». 
Mktv^tLfTd4047 
AWL 7. 3002 
rrAT* of UTAM 
NOTARY PWvIC 
Resiaing< 
My Commission Expires: 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
DATED this a2S day of Januaiy, 2000, 
r NOTAm PUgtfC 
MARIUSZ BJENKOWSKJ 
Defendant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SvioRN to before me this ^2? day of January, 2000 
My Commission Expires: 08/23/2001 
5 
Attorney for Defendant 
7700 South Maple Street 
Midvais, Utah 64641 
Phonei 255-1261 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA MUNFORD, 
Plaintiff ORDEF 
v. 
MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKT, 
Defendant 
Civil No. 990906380 
Judge: Glenn K, Iwasaki 
Based upon th<* nripulation of thp parties, a copy of which 
is on file herein, and other good and sufficient cause having 
been shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED: 
1* That the stipulation of the parties is approved and the 
above entitled matter is dismissed with prejudice. TXt fej**** of fb-
Jt'pvLiJ^t* ^ * ^ c ^ C M / M A / I C / *LX /*«rtt +/*%(** 0,*Z*A • 
DATED this 3ls~h vday of A~<^7vum^ 2000, 
BY THE COURT; 
O R D E R 
BASED upon the motion filed by plaintiff, a copy of 
which is on file herein, and other good and sufficient cause 
having been shown, it is hereby ordered and decreed that this 
action be dismissed. 
\ 
DATED this ^1 day of vJi>l/uu-M^  , 2000. 
Q 
BY THE COURT: 
Thira Judicial District jfr 
JAN , _;j / 
SALT LAKE CjQU.NTY Mariusz Bienkowski, Pro Se 
P.O. Box 712425 By-
Salt Lake City, Utah 84171-2425 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT rXAKE 'COUNTY'"•-* 
STATE OF UTAH JAM , 
-J - V - Z „ K 
MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LINDA MUNFORD, 
Defendant. 
By. 
MOTION AND ORDER TO 
DISMISS PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Case No. 994905991CA 
Judge: Homer F. Wilkinson 
COMES NOW, plaintiff and moves the above-entitled court 
to dismiss the protective order that has been entered in this 
matter. 
DATED this £$ day of January, 2000, 
'OTARY PUBLIC 
•<r<M J PEZELY 
- */i*\ owv*ew Rd 
w ... ^ m 44157 
n<rii>^on Expires 
VJQJSI 23fX3 2001 
--TATE OF UTAH 
/J& ec^J^t^^ 
MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI 
Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this f January, 2000 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in: Murray, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 08/23/2001 
Linda Munford, Pro Se 
5242 Cobblecreek Road, #11-H 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Phone: 424-3526/560-6580 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 3 1 201 
8ALTLAKE 
* A ^ 
Deputy Clerfc 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA MUNFORD, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI, 
Defendant. 
MOTION AND ORDER TO 
DISMISS PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Case No. 994906198CA 
Judge: William Bohling 
COMES NOW, plaintiff and moves the above-entitled court 
to dismiss the protective order that has been entered in this 
matter. 
^ 
DATED this(9?y day of January, 2000, 
vda yyiuiJ-c^tx 
:NDA MUNFORD 
Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this<5o_ day of January, 2000 
NOTARY PUftijc • 
J V ^ L 7, 2002 
STATE OF UTAM 
My Commission Expires: 
Bradley! Schofieid, #1520 
Anderson & Holland 
623 East First South 
P.O.Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643 
Telephone: (801) 363-9345 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNT ', - "ATE (V UT/yH 
LINDA MUNFORD, ; 
Plaintiff, } 
vs ] 
MARTUSZ BIENKOWSKI, 
Defendant 
> REPLY TO MOTION TO SET 
> ASIDE STIPULATION AND ORDER 
> Civil No. 990906380 
I Judge Glen K. Iwasaki 
COMTS NOW Defendant by and through his attorney, Bradley J Schofieid, and 
hereby submits the following Reply to Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Stipulation md 
Order as follows 
FACTS 
I That Plaintiff was represented by Randy S Ludlow, Esq., in the above-
entitled action 
2. That Plaintiff fired said counsel before trial date. 
3 That Plaintiff contacted Defendant's counsel, Martin Pezely (Pezely), 
stating that she wanted a Settlement Agreement between the parties. 
4. That Plaintiff stated to Pezely that she needed Defendant to dismiss his 
protective order against her in order for her to be released from Oxbow jail, where she 
was being held on an unrelated matter 
5. That Plaintiff told Pezely what provisions she would agree to in said 
Settlement Agreement 
6. That after advising his client, Pezely drafted said Settlement Agreement 
according to Plaintiffs instructions 
7 That Plaintiff and Defendant entered mto a Settlement Agreement on or 
about January 28, 2000. A copy of said Settlement Agreement is attached and marked 
Exhibit "A". 
8. That both parties signed said Settlement Agreement m front of a Notary 
Public 
9 That paragraph 6 of said Settlement Agreement states that both Plaintiff 
and Defendant would try to get the protective order against the other dismissed 
10 That the criminal matter in which Defendant was serving time in jail was 
unrelated to any and all matters pertaining to Plaintiff and Defendant A copy of 
Plaintiffs record for Case No 991107201 is attached and marked Exhibit *T3" 
ARGUMENT 
THERE WAS .NO DURESS IN THE EXECUTION OF SAID SETTLEMfaNl 
AGREEMENT 
I. The Parties Agreed To Mutually Dismiss Protective Orders tiled Against Both Parties 
Plaintiff states that she "had to give up everything", m older to get Defendant to 
agTee to dismiss a protective order against her However, Plaintiff was the party who 
requested the dismissal of the protective orders I urthei, both paities had protective 
orders against the other and it was agreed that they would mutually dismiss said 
protective orders in paragraph 6 of said Settlement Agreement. See Exhibit 4tA" 
Mutually agreeing to dismiss protective orders whjch were in place against both 
parties certainly does not appear to be putting one of the parties under duress. In fact, 
Defendant did not want the protective order against Plaintiff dismissed, but m the interest 
of settling several matters between the parties he agreed to said provision. 
As shown by the records of Plaintiffs said criminal matter, there is no mention of 
getting said protective oider dismissed in ordei for Plaintiff to be released from jail See 
Fxhibit "B" 
Plaintiff alleges that she could not be released from jail without said protective 
order being dismissed, yet proffers no evidence that dismissal of said protective order by 
Defendant was a prerequisite to her release from jail Even if Defendant knew that 
Plaintiff could be released upon his dismissal of sand protective order, Plaintiff received 
consideration equal to that of Defendant in that both parties were required to dismiss their 
respective protective orders against the other 
Plamtift has not satisfied her burden of pioof showing that the dismissal of said 
protective older enabled her to be released from incarceration Additionally, even had the 
dismissal of said protective order been a pre requisite to Plaintiff being released from jail, 
Plaintiff received the exact consideration as did Defendant 
II. Plaintiff Approached Defendant For a Settlement Agreement 
Plaintiff was the party \*ho appioached Defendant in order to diaft a Settlement 
Agreement See Affidavit of Martin J Pezely Additionally, Plaintiff contacted Pe/cly 
and indicated the provisions she wanted in said Settlement Agreement Pczelv prepared 
and presented a draft of said Settlement Agreement to Plaintiff for her approval while she 
was serving time at Oxbow jail on an unrelated matter. Plaintiff reviewed said Settlement 
Agreement for several hours and executed the document without any complaints or 
concerns to Pezely concerning said Settlement Agieement 
Certainly, a person who approaches another in the interest of settling litigation is 
not put under duress Io sign the very agreement they requested 
III. riairt tiff has not shown Any Duress In Execution Of Settlement Agt cement 
Plaintiff has not offeied any proof that said Settlement was executed undei duiess 
In order to invalidate an agreement the party bringing the action must show the following 
three factors, I) that the other contracting party committed a wrongful act, 7) which put 
the initial party m fear, 3) such as to compel him to act against his will Fox v Piercev, 
227 P 2d 763 (Utah 1951) 
Defendant did not Commit any wrongful acts Plaintiff and Defendant entered into 
a Settlement Agreement of their own free will Plaintiff was advised fo seek legal counsel 
when discussing the possibility of a Settlement Agreement in order to resolve matters 
concerning the parties See the Affidavit of Martin I Peezely Both parties gave and 
received consideration for said Settlement Agreement Finally, Plaintiff lias offered no 
pioof that there was any wrongdoing on the part of Defendant 
Plaintiff was not put in fear by Defendant Simply because Plaintiff could he 
released from jail only if she had said protective order dismissed does not show that 
Plaintiff was m feai Again Plaintiff has shown no proof tint Defendant forced her to 
stipulate to all of the facts contained in the Settlement Agreement in oidei to agree to 
dismiss said protective order 
Lastly, Plaintiff was not compelled to act against her will. From the face of the 
Settlement Agreement there is no sign that Plaintiff signed said document against her 
will. Plaintiff has not offered any proof that said Settlement Agreement wa$ against her 
will, thus Plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of proof 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Settlement Agreement and both parties 
signed the document m fiont of a notary The Settlement Agreement was to resolve issues 
between the parties so that they could both move ort with their lives Plaintiff has failed to 
prove any of the allegations set forth in her Motion and Memorandum to Set Aside 
Stipulation and Order 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Motion should be dismissed 
DA r ED tins _p day of Mjry 
B 
Attorney for Defendant 
J"» 
> ^ 
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Rex B. Bushman, Esq. #0521 
REX B. BUSHMAN, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
115 E. Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-8020 
Facsimile: (801) 533-8877 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA MUNFORD, : 
Plaintiff, : REPLY MEMORANDUN 
vs. : 
MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI, : Civil No. 990906380 
Defendant. : Judge Glen K. Iwasaki 
COMES NOW the above named plaintiff, Linda Munford, by 
and through counsel of record, Rex B. Bushman, and hereby 
replies to defendant's Reply (Response) To Motion To Set Aside 
Stipulation And Order, stating as follows: 
REPLY FACTS 
1. In reply to the statement of defendant's former 
counsel and to complete the scenario of events of the 
settlement as plaintiff recalls, she hereby adds the following 
to the facts stated in her initial affidavit included with 
plaintiff's Memorandun In Support of Motion To Set Aside 
Stipulation And Order. 
2. Plaintiff was incarcerated on January 5th, 2000, and 
on January 7th, she applied for release on the ankle monitor 
-1-
system which would allow release from the Oxbow jail and that 
she could go back to work. 
3. Sgt. Cogburn informed her that with a pending 
restraining order she could not be released on the ankle 
monitor system pursuant to the offender eligibility criteria 
under Procedure: Section Criteria, Section A.2.c. (See 
Exhibit MAff attached to plaintiff's reply affidavit attached 
hereto). She was informed she met all other criteria. 
4. Plaintiff called her friend Teresa, and asked her to 
contact the defendant and ask him for a mutual dismissal of 
protective orders. 
5. The defendant responded that he would not drop the 
protective order unless plaintiff gave him ownership of her 
car, dismiss a $5,000.00 judgment against him and give him 
most of the belongings in her home. The estimated requirement 
was that plaintiff pay about $20,000.00 for defendant to drop 
his protective order. 
6. Defendant then told his attorney plaintiff wanted to 
give him everything for dropping the protective order and had 
Mr. Pezely draw up the stipulation. Defendant informed Mr. 
Pezely what to put in the agreement. 
7. Mr. Pezely didn!t even know plaintiff was 
incarcerated when he drew up the papers but found out when 
plaintiff called after waiting for three weeks for the 
agreement to be prepared. Until then, Mr. Pezely thought 
plaintiff had just agreed to give defendant everything. 
-2-
8. Mr. Pezely was surprised plaintiff was doing this to 
get released from jail. He wasn't sure plaintiff needed to 
drop the protective order to get released. He just thought 
plaintiff decided to give defendant everything for her own 
reasons, 
9. Not only was plaintiff awaiting hoped for release 
from the suffering of incarceration but her daughter was having 
serious health problems as indicated by her doctor's letter, 
(see Exhibit !lBff attached to plaintiff's reply affidavit, 
attached hereto), and plaintiff was needed to give her care 
where no one else was available. 
10. Further evidence the release of the protective 
order was required before plaintiff could leave jail is 
plaintiffTs son's affidavit attached to plaintiff's reply 
affidavit, attached hereto as Exhibit "C" about his 
conversation with Sgt. Cogburn. A friend's statement is also 
attached hereto as Exhibit "D" regarding her conversation with 
Sgt. Cogburn. 
11. Plaintiff had the stipulation documents for about 
five minutes. A notary stood by, plaintiff signed and the 
notary took the papers. Mr. Pezely may not have come to pick 
them up until later but they were not in plaintiff's possession 
for several hours. 
12. When plaintiff finally spoke to Mr. Pezely she told 
him she wasn't happy about giving up everything required but 
she needed to care for her daughter. 
-3-
See Reply Affidavit of Linda Munford, attached hereto 
for facts and Exhibits designated herebefore. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROTECTIVE ORDER HAD TO BE DISMISSED BEFORE 
PLAINTIFF COULD LEAVE JAIL. 
Defendant has argued in response to plaintiff's 
Memorandum supporting Motion To Set Aside Stipulation And 
Order, that no proof has been shown that plaintiff could not be 
released from jail without withdrawal or dismissal of the 
defendant's protective order. 
Plaintiff submits in this Reply Memorandum including her 
Reply Affidavit, evidence that proves she could not be released 
without the dismissal of the defendant's protective order. 
Included in the evidence submitted herewith is plaintiff's 
sworn statement, the actual rule received from Sgt. Cogburn 
which shows the requirements for release from the Oxbow jail 
including Section A.2.c. stating specifically the requirement 
"no protective orders". Also included herewith are the sworn 
statements of plaintiff's son and friend who both talked to 
Sgt. Cogburn and confirmed that plaintiff could not be released 
from jail while the protective order was in effect. 
Thus the argument that the plaintiff did not need 
dismissal of the protective order to obtain he release must 
fail and the plaintiff's argument that she was under duress and 
fear that she would not otherwise be released is applicable and 
subject to the doctrine of Fox vs. Piercey, 227 P. 2d 763 (Utah 
1951). The defendant (1) committed a wrongful act by requiring 
-4-
approximately $20,000.00 for the trade of dismissing his 
protective order; (2) plaintiff was in fear of not being able 
to obtain her release otherwise; and (3) she was required to 
act against her will. 
As a person in jail plaintiff was in distress. 
Plaintiff has not elaborated on the suffering of an individual 
in jail because the suffering of being incarcerated is 
assumable as punishment at an exquisite level. Courts will not 
enforce a bargain where one party has unconscionably taken 
advantage of the distress of the other. Inman vs. Clyde 
Hall Drilling Co., 369 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1962). 
II. PLAINTIFF HAD TO OBTAIN RELEASE FROM JAIL TO TAKE 
CARE OF HER DAUGHTER WHO WAS SERIOUSLY ILL. 
Defendant has acquiesced to plaintifffsargument that she 
needed to obtain release from jail to take care of her daughter 
who was seriously ill and plaintiff the only available person 
to care for the daughter. Plaintiff further submits herein her 
daughter's doctor's letter evidencing the daughter's serious 
health condition diagnosed on the day after plaintiff was 
incarcerated. Defendant has failed to respond to plaintiff!s 
argument on that issue and therefor allows that plaintiff was 
under duress and fear that required her to act against her will 
to obtain release for the sake of her daughter's health. 
Given plaintiff's status as incarcerated and that her 
daughter needed her care for a serious illness, plaintiff had 
no reasonable alternative but to agree to defendant's demands. 
The doctrine of duress shall remedy such an occurrence where 
-5-
7& 
plaintiff was compelled to act as she did with no reasonable 
alternative. Frank Culver Elec, Inc. vs. Jorgenson, 664 P. 2d 
226 (Ariz. 1983) . 
III. PLAINTIFF ONLY REQUESTED DISMISSAL OF PROTECTIVE 
ORDERS, DEFENDANT WRONGFULLY REQUIRED MORE. 
Plaintiff only requested of defendant the mutual 
dismissal of protective orders. It was the defendant who 
required further settlement of approximately $20,000.00 from 
plaintiff to defendant for the mutual dismisal of protective 
orders. 
Plaintiff denies offering the terms of settlement to 
defendant's attorney. Further, plaintiff denies having been 
requested by defendant's attorney to seek the advice of 
counsel. Instead plaintiff was advised to fire her attorney, 
which she did. Otherwise Pezely couldn't prepare the stipulation. 
The requirement of a wrongful act may be met if it is 
wrongful in the moral sense. Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. 
vs. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 584 P.2d 15, (Alaska 1978) 9 
A.L.R. 4th 928. The requirement of a trade of $20,000.00 to 
obtain the mutual release of protective orders is immoral even 
if plaintiff wasn't incarcerated or needing to care for a 
daughter in ill health. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has met all conditions under Utah law of 
Fox vs. Piercey to be relieved of the subject stipulation and 
order herein by way of the doctrine of duress. 
-6-
DATED this j % day of May, 2000. 
REX B. BUSHMAN, P.C. 
Rex B. Bushman 
-7-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM with accompanying REPLY 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA MUNFORD to the following counsel, postage 
prepaid and by U.S. Mail, this j'/j^  day of May, 2000: 
Bradley J. Schofield 
Anderson & Holland 
623 East First South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0643 
-8-
Rex B. Bushman, Esq. #0521 
REX B. BUSHMAN, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
115 E. Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-8020 
Facsimile: (801) 533-8877 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA MUNFORD, : 
Plaintiff, : REPLY AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA 
MUNFORD 
VS. : 
MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI, : Civil No. 990906380 
Defendant. : Judge Glen K. Iwasaki 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Linda Munford, hereby depose and state under oath as 
follows: 
1. In response to the statement of defendant's former 
counsel and to complete the scenario of events of the 
settlement as I recall I would like to add the following to my 
former affidavit. 
2. I was incarcerated on January 5th, 2000 and on 
January 7th I applied for release on the ankle monitor system 
which would allow release from the Oxbow jail and allow me to 
go to work. 
3. Sgt. Cogburn informed me that with a pending 
restraining order I could not be released on the ankle monitor 
system pursuant to the offender eligibility criteria under 
Procedure: Section Criteria Section A.2.c. (See Exhibit "Afl 
included herewith.) I was informed I met all other criteria. 
4. 1 called my friend Teresa, and asked her to contact 
the defendant and ask him to drop his protective order. 
5. The defendant responded that he would not drop the 
protective order unless I gave him ownership of my car, 
dismissed a $5,000.00 judgment against him and gave him most of 
the belongings in my house. The estimate requirement was about 
$20,000.00 for dropping the protective order. 
6. Defendant then told his attorney I wanted to give 
him everything for dropping the restraining order and had Mr. 
Pezely draw up the stipulation. Defendant informed Mr. Pezely 
what to put in the agreement. 
7. Mr. Pezely didnft even know I was incarcerated when 
he drew up the papers but found out when I called after waiting 
for three weeks for the agreement to be prepared. Until then, 
Mr. Pezely thought I had just agreed to give defendant 
everything. 
8. Mr. Pezely was surprised I was doing this to get 
released from jail. He wasn't sure I needed to drop the 
protective order to get released. He just thought I had 
decided to give defendant everything. 
9. Not only was I awaiting hoped for release from the 
suffering of incarceration but my daughter was having serious 
health problems as indicated by her doctor's letter, (See 
Exhibit "B" attached hereto), and I was needed to give her care 
where no one else was avialable. 
10. For further evidence the release of protective 
order was required before I could leave jail is my son's 
affidavit attached hereto as Exhibit ffCM about his conversation 
with Sgt. Cogburn. A friend's statement is also attached 
hereto as Exhibit "D" regarding her conversation with Sgt. 
Cogburn. 
11. I was requested to fire my attorney, which I did. 
12. I had the stipulation documents for about five 
minutes. A notary stood by, I signed and she took the papers. 
Mr. Pezely may not have come to pick them up until later but 
they were not in my possession for several hours. 
13. When I finally spoke to Mr. Pezely 1 told him I 
wasn't happy about giving up everything required but I needed 
to care for my daughter. 
DATED this i\2 ^day of May, 2000. 
Linda Munford 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1 CV day of 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Purpose of Chapter 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the Department's policy, procedure 
and requirements governing the use of Operations of the Electronic Monitonng 
program. 
Definitions: 
Alarm: Electronic signal emitted when the transmitter leaves the reception area of the receiver during a 
penod of designated confinement 
Electronic Monitonng: 
1 Places an electronic transmitter on the body of the offender, 
2 Sending a signal to a receiver installed in the offender's home, and 
3 Logs the offenders movement in and out of the range of the receiver 
Host Computer: The mam computer system through which the functions of the Electronic Monitonng 
Program are processed. 
OFFENDER ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA 
Policy 
The Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office Electronic Momtonng program is to monitor the location and 
movements of offenders living outside of confinement, who have been deemed by the Electronic 
Momtonng Officer eligible to participate in the program 
Rational 
Electronic Monitonng provides increased supervisory control of offenders living outside of confinement 
and provides additional protection to the community not otherwise available through traditional 
supervision methods 
Procedure: Section Criteria 
A In order for an offender to be eligible for electronic monitonng, the offender shall 
1 Live in Salt Lake County, and/or adjoining counties 
2 Be designated as low risk and does not fall into anv of the following criteria 
a aggravated or violent felony offense, 
b domestic violence one year, if committed m the Present of Children never 
BQ protective ordera, ex parte orders 
d no escapes past 1 years 5 years if they run while on this program, 
e no convictions burglary of a dwelling, 
f no enmes against children, 
g no felony sex crimes, 
h no transients, 
l no juveniles, 
j no holds lor other agencies, CM will be considered and WA will not be considered 
c 
E x h i b i t "A" 
2 
k. no active gang members; NCIC hits or listed with Metro Gangs as active. 
1. no Federal holds of ACQLtype. 
3. Must have a private phone line in his/her home or have one installed and shall bear the cost of 
installation and the monthly fees and any other special fees required. 
4. Must have permanent residence during the length of the Electronic Monitoring program. 
B. Any exceptions to the above critena shall be approved by the momtonng officer prior to an offender being 
accepted into the program. 
REFERENCE PROCEDURE 
Policy 
Is it the policy of the Department that: 
A. Offenders shall meet the cntena outlined in this chapter for acceptance into the program and all references 
shall be evaluated by the Electronic Monitormg Officer, and 
B. The Electronic Momtonng Supervisor may approve the acceptance of any offender mto the program who 
does not meet the established cnteria. 
Rationale 
Because resources are limited for this program due to high cost of equipment, stringent selection critena 
must be used. 
Procedure: Reference Procedure 
References will be taken from the Sheriffs Electronic Monitoring Application that is filled out by the 
offender, or a refenal given to us by the applicant's references 
A. Offenders will give a minimum of three references, of which two must be positive for the offender, 
and 
a reference from a member of the residence where the offender will be staying who mustbe at least 
18 years old 
B If the reference is not the owner of the residence, the residence owner must be contacted, ana agree 
to remove all cunent phone features from the phone line that will be connected to the monitor 
INSTALLATION 
Policy 
It is the policy of the Department that the olfender shall bear the cost of any phone installation or monthly 
tees as well as the replacement cost for any Department equipment which may be lost, stolen or damaged 
while the offender is in the program. 
Rationale 
Salt, 
Lang 
Women's 
Center, T.C 
May 10, 2000 
Re Rachael Munford 
To Whom it May Concern, 
Rachacl is patient who was diagnosed with a positive H Pylori on January 3, 2000 
Michael I Twede, M D 
-7—P-^1— 
OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY INFFRTI! ITY MICRO & USER SURGFRY 
Dale A SundwaU, M D FACOG Michael I Twede, M D FACOG 
1001 1 South C rntrnnial PnUav SuiV ^0 cardy I !ah R40/0 Phono KOI C>M Wll 
AFFADAVIT 
May 11, 2000 
On January 5*, 2000, my mother was incarcerated at the Oxbow Facility. On January 7 l , 
she applied for the electronic monitoring program and was denied because of a protective 
order that was in force between her and Mariusz Bienkowski. 
I met with Sgt. Cogburn at Oxbow and he informed me that my mother, Linda Munford, 
could not be released until the protective order from Mariusz was dropped. 
DATED this / / day of May, 2000. 
-7 ? s 
Vance Malan 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / / ^ A day of May. 2000. 
Notary Public 
1 /<f- '*•»>% ^ T A ^ Y ^ 3 L . C 
1
 / C f - n r ^ / ' T A 2EANM C3R3E— 
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OMMISSION EXP'RES ! 
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AFFADAVIT 
May 11,2000 
On January 5rh, 2000, my mother, Linda Munford was incarcerated at the Oxbow 
Facility.On January 7th, she applied for the electronic monitoring program and was 
denied because of a protective order that was in force between her and Mariusz 
Bienkowski. 
I called and spoke with Sgt. Cogburn at Oxbow and he told me that my mother could be 
released if the protective order was dropped. . 
DATED this day of Ma 
Rachael Mu 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
RYAN STANTON 
1344 West 4675 South 
Ogden, Utah 84405 
My Commission Expires 
April 14 2004 
STVTE OF UTAH 
E x h i b i t "DM 
Rex B. Bushman, Esq. #0521 
REX B. BUSHMAN, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
115 E. Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-8020 
Facsimile: (801) 533-8877 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Linda Munford, 
Plaintiff, : NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
vs. : 
MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI, : Civil No. 990906380 
Defendant. : Judge Glen K. Iwasaki 
COMES NOW the above named plaintiff, Linda Munford, by 
and through counsel of record, Rex B. Bushman, and hereby 
submits for decision, Plaintiff's MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
STIPULATION AND ORDER filed with the above Court with 
Plaintiff's MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIPE 
STIPULATION AND ORDER on or about April 19, 2000. Defendant 
responded with a REPLY TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE STIPULATION AND 
ORDER submitted on or about May 2, 2000. On May 12, 2000, 
plaintiff filed a REPLY MEMORANDUM. The matter is now ready 
for the adjudication of the above Court. 
This Notice to Submit For Decision is brought pursuant 
to Rule 4-501 Code of Judicial Administration, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
DATED this /^ day of May, 2000. 
REX B. BUSHMAN, P.C 
By 
Rex B. Bushman 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION to the following 
counsel, postage prepaid and by U.S. Mail, this j J, day of 
May, 2000: 
Bradley J. Schofield 
Anderson & Holland 
623 East First South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643 
1-^iY A' ^i'M^> 
J. Kent Holland, Z1520 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
623 East First South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643 
Telephone: (801) 363-9345 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA MUNFORD ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI, ; 
Defendant. 
) ORDER TO DENY MOTION TO 
) SET ASIDE STIPULATION AND 
) ORDER 
) Civil No • 990906380 
) Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The above-entitled matter came before the court on June 20, 2000, the Plaintiff 
was represented by, her counsel Rex B Bushman and Defendant Mariusz Bienkowski 
was represented by, his counsel J Kent Holland After heanng oral argument and good 
cause showing regarding the matter it is hereby ordered 
THAT THE MOTION IS HEREBY DENIED 
DATED this ^ day of j " ty ^ £ 2000 
BY THE COURT 
HONERABLE GLENN K IWASAKI 
Approved as to frojru, P/ 7* £ 
Rex B Bushman 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of Defendant's Order to deny Motion to set aside stipulation and 
Order, in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this day 
of June, 2000. Addressed to: 
Rex B. Bushman Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
115 E. Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
4#«; ^ y j 
Rex B. Bushman, Esq. #0521 
REX B. BUSHMAN, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Appellant 
115 E. Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-8020 
Facsimile: (801) 533-8877 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA MUNFORD, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
vs. 
MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI, 
Defendant, Appellee. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 990906380 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
COMES NOW the above named plaintiff, appellant, Linda 
Munford, by and through counsel of record, and hereby appeals 
the Order To Deny Motion To Set Aside Stipulation And Order 
previously authorized by the above Court on June 29, 2000, a 
copy of which is attached hereto. The appellee is the above 
named defendant Mariusz Bienkowski. This appeal is taken from 
the Third Judicial District Court to the Utah Appellate Court. 
This appeal is brought pursuant to Rule 3 Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure from a final Order of the Third Judicial 
District Court. 
DATED this >L7 day of July, 2000, 
REX B. BUSHMAN, P.C. 
By: ?£/-yC 
Rex B. Bushman 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to the following counsel, 
postage prepaid and by U.S. Mail, this '<Lk> day of July, 
2000: 
J . Kent Holland 
Anderson & Holland 
623 East F i r s t South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Sa l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84147-0643 
Cdft'l A H j i V i ^ l 
ADDENDUM 
A: Exhibit "A" - Elibibity Criteria (attached to Reply Memorandum 
B: Exhibit "B" - Letter from Doctor (attached to Reply Memorandum 
C: Exhibit "C" - Son's discussion with Sgt. Cogburn (attached to Reply 
Memorandum) 
D: Exhibit "D" - Daughter's conversation with Sgt. Cogburn (attached 
To Reply Memordandum) 
A: "Stipulation" allowing for Judgment in amount of $1,400.00 
(attached to Settlement Agreement) 
B: "Stipulation" allowing return of property 
(attached to Settlement Agreement) 
C: "Stipulation" Dismissing Protective Orders 
(attached to Settlement Agreement) 
D. Defendant's Reply to Motion to Set Aside Stipulation & Order 
E. Reply Memorandum - Plaintiff 
F. Notice to Submit for Decision 
G. Order to Deny Motion to Set Aside Stipulation & Order 
I. Notice of Appeal 
